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题名Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective
作者
发表日期2024-07-10
发表期刊Journal of Cleaner Production
ISSN/eISSN0959-6526
卷号462
摘要

As the battery recycling market in China is still in an embroynic stage, the mechanisms, channels, pricing, and efficiency of battery recycling are shrouded in opacity. Battery recycling in China is currently dominated by electric vehicle manufacturer, supplemented by other market players such as battery producers and electric vehicle retailers. Due to the lack of information, battery recycling lacks cooperation and communication, and the whole market is dealing with “Information Island.” Therefore, based on information sharing and channel competition, this paper designs a Stackelberg game model with an electric vehicle manufacturer, an electric vehicle retailer, and a third-party recycler as the primary participants. This study found that effective information sharing can reduce intensified market competition and promote the transformation of market players into “collaboration state”. To promote partnership in the battery recycling market, this paper proposes a revenue-sharing contract incentive for the electric vehicle retailer to share demand information about battery recycling. It finds a revenue-sharing contract based on information sharing can help companies and competitors make appropriate behavioral choices in the battery recycling market. This study demonstrates that information sharing benefits the electric vehicle manufacturer and the third-party recycler while offering no advantages to the electric vehicle retailer. The decreasing accuracy of demand signals results in the diminishing value of information sharing for the electric vehicle manufacturer and the third-party recycler. The revenue-sharing contract can incentivize the electric vehicle retailer to share information.

关键词Battery recycling Information sharing Mode selection Revenue-sharing contract Stackelberg game
DOI10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.142701
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语种英语English
Scopus入藏号2-s2.0-85194531823
引用统计
被引频次:4[WOS]   [WOS记录]     [WOS相关记录]
文献类型期刊论文
条目标识符https://repository.uic.edu.cn/handle/39GCC9TT/11741
专题工商管理学院
通讯作者Ng, Adolf K.Y.
作者单位
1.Collaborative Innovation Center for Transport Studies (CICTS),Dalian Maritime University,Dalian,China
2.School of Maritime Economics and Management,Dalian Maritime University,Dalian,China
3.Faculty of Business and Management,Institute for Advanced Study,BNU-HKBU United International College,Zhuhai,China
通讯作者单位北师香港浸会大学
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GB/T 7714
Feng, Lin,Qu, Mengru,Ng, Adolf K.Y.et al. Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2024, 462.
APA Feng, Lin, Qu, Mengru, Ng, Adolf K.Y., Jia, Peng, & Kuang, Haibo. (2024). Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production, 462.
MLA Feng, Lin,et al."Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective". Journal of Cleaner Production 462(2024).
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