发表状态 | 已发表Published |
题名 | Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective |
作者 | |
发表日期 | 2024-07-10 |
发表期刊 | Journal of Cleaner Production
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ISSN/eISSN | 0959-6526 |
卷号 | 462 |
摘要 | As the battery recycling market in China is still in an embroynic stage, the mechanisms, channels, pricing, and efficiency of battery recycling are shrouded in opacity. Battery recycling in China is currently dominated by electric vehicle manufacturer, supplemented by other market players such as battery producers and electric vehicle retailers. Due to the lack of information, battery recycling lacks cooperation and communication, and the whole market is dealing with “Information Island.” Therefore, based on information sharing and channel competition, this paper designs a Stackelberg game model with an electric vehicle manufacturer, an electric vehicle retailer, and a third-party recycler as the primary participants. This study found that effective information sharing can reduce intensified market competition and promote the transformation of market players into “collaboration state”. To promote partnership in the battery recycling market, this paper proposes a revenue-sharing contract incentive for the electric vehicle retailer to share demand information about battery recycling. It finds a revenue-sharing contract based on information sharing can help companies and competitors make appropriate behavioral choices in the battery recycling market. This study demonstrates that information sharing benefits the electric vehicle manufacturer and the third-party recycler while offering no advantages to the electric vehicle retailer. The decreasing accuracy of demand signals results in the diminishing value of information sharing for the electric vehicle manufacturer and the third-party recycler. The revenue-sharing contract can incentivize the electric vehicle retailer to share information. |
关键词 | Battery recycling Information sharing Mode selection Revenue-sharing contract Stackelberg game |
DOI | 10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.142701 |
URL | 查看来源 |
语种 | 英语English |
Scopus入藏号 | 2-s2.0-85194531823 |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | https://repository.uic.edu.cn/handle/39GCC9TT/11741 |
专题 | 工商管理学院 |
通讯作者 | Ng, Adolf K.Y. |
作者单位 | 1.Collaborative Innovation Center for Transport Studies (CICTS),Dalian Maritime University,Dalian,China 2.School of Maritime Economics and Management,Dalian Maritime University,Dalian,China 3.Faculty of Business and Management,Institute for Advanced Study,BNU-HKBU United International College,Zhuhai,China |
通讯作者单位 | 北师香港浸会大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Feng, Lin,Qu, Mengru,Ng, Adolf K.Y.et al. Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2024, 462. |
APA | Feng, Lin, Qu, Mengru, Ng, Adolf K.Y., Jia, Peng, & Kuang, Haibo. (2024). Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective. Journal of Cleaner Production, 462. |
MLA | Feng, Lin,et al."Battery recycling models selection and contractual incentives: From an information sharing perspective". Journal of Cleaner Production 462(2024). |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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