题名 | A new cell counter based attack against Tor |
作者 | |
发表日期 | 2009 |
会议名称 | 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS'09 |
会议录名称 | Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
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ISBN | 978-1-60558-894-0 |
页码 | 578-589 |
会议日期 | NOV 09-13, 2009 |
会议地点 | Chicago, Illinois, USA |
摘要 | Various low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor and Anoymizer have been designed to provide anonymity service for users. In order to hide the communication of users, many anonymity systems pack the application data into equal-sized cells (e.g., 512 bytes for Tor, a known real-world, circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication network). In this paper, we investigate a new cell counter based attack against Tor, which allows the attacker to confirm anonymous communication relationship among users very quickly. In this attack, by marginally varying the counter of cells in the target traffic at the malicious exit onion router, the attacker can embed a secret signal into the variation of cell counter of the target traffic. The embedded signal will be carried along with the target traffic and arrive at the malicious entry onion router. Then an accomplice of the attacker at the malicious entry onion router will detect the embedded signal based on the received cells and confirm the communication relationship among users. We have implemented this attack against Tor and our experimental data validate its feasibility and effectiveness. There are several unique features of this attack. First, this attack is highly efficient and can confirm very short communication sessions with only tens of cells. Second, this attack is effective and its detection rate approaches 100% with a very low false positive rate. Third, it is possible to implement the attack in a way that appears to be very difficult for honest participants to detect (e.g. using our hopping-based signal embedding). Copyright 2009 ACM. |
关键词 | Anonymity Cell counter Mix networks Signal Tor |
DOI | 10.1145/1653662.1653732 |
URL | 查看来源 |
收录类别 | CPCI-S |
语种 | 英语English |
WOS研究方向 | Computer Science ; Telecommunications |
WOS类目 | Computer Science, Theory & Methods ; Telecommunications |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000281662800053 |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 会议论文 |
条目标识符 | https://repository.uic.edu.cn/handle/39GCC9TT/4541 |
专题 | 个人在本单位外知识产出 |
作者单位 | 1.Southeast University, 2 Sipailou, Nanjing 210096, China 2.Towson University, 8000 York Road, Towson, MD 21252, United States 3.University of Massachusetts Lowell, One University Avenue, Lowell, MA 01854, United States 4.Ohio State University, 2015 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210, United States 5.City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ling, Zhen,Luo, Junzhou,Yu, Weiet al. A new cell counter based attack against Tor[C], 2009: 578-589. |
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