发表状态 | 已发表Published |
题名 | The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler |
作者 | |
发表日期 | 2020-10-24 |
发表期刊 | Theoretical Computer Science
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ISSN/eISSN | 0304-3975 |
卷号 | 838页码:180-194 |
摘要 | We study the efficiency of Nash equilibria for the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler. In the game, we are given a set of facilities and a set of players along with a scheduler, where each facility is associated with a linear cost function, and the players are randomly ordered by the scheduler. Each player chooses exactly one of these facilities to fulfill his task, which incurs to him a cost depending on not only the cost function of the facility he chooses and the players who choose the same facility (as in a usual load balancing game), but also his uncertain position in the uniform random ordering. From an individual perspective, each player tries to choose a facility for optimizing his own objective that is determined by a certain decision-making principle. From a system perspective, it is desirable to minimize the maximum cost among all players, which is a commonly used criterion for load balancing. We estimate the price of anarchy and price of stability for this class of load balancing games under uncertainty, provided all players follow one of the four decision-making principles, namely the bottom-out, win-or-go-home, minimum-expected-cost, and minimax-regret principles. Our results show that the efficiency loss of Nash equilibria in these decentralized environments heavily rely on player's attitude toward the uncertainty. |
关键词 | Decision-making principle Load balancing game Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy Price of stability |
DOI | 10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.024 |
URL | 查看来源 |
收录类别 | SCIE |
语种 | 英语English |
WOS研究方向 | Computer Science |
WOS类目 | Computer Science, Theory & Methods |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000566368800014 |
Scopus入藏号 | 2-s2.0-85088865562 |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | https://repository.uic.edu.cn/handle/39GCC9TT/9235 |
专题 | 个人在本单位外知识产出 |
通讯作者 | Wu, Xiaoying |
作者单位 | 1.Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100190,China 2.School of Mathematical Sciences,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100049,China 3.City University of Hong Kong,Hong Kong |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chen, Xujin,Hu, Xiaodong,Wang, Chenhaoet al. The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler[J]. Theoretical Computer Science, 2020, 838: 180-194. |
APA | Chen, Xujin, Hu, Xiaodong, Wang, Chenhao, & Wu, Xiaoying. (2020). The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler. Theoretical Computer Science, 838, 180-194. |
MLA | Chen, Xujin,et al."The efficiency of Nash equilibria in the load balancing game with a randomizing scheduler". Theoretical Computer Science 838(2020): 180-194. |
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