×
验证码:
换一张
忘记密码?
记住我
×
登录
中文
|
English
学校主页
|
图书馆
登录
注册
首页
学术成果
学院
学者
数据分析
检索
ALL
ORCID
题名
作者
发表日期
关键词
文献类型
原始文献类型
收录类别
出版者
状态
学院
理工科技学院
7
个人在本单位外知识产出
5
作者
王晨豪
10
骆宗伟
2
文献类型
期刊论文
7
会议论文
4
著作章节
1
发表日期
2024
1
2023
2
2022
4
2021
1
2020
1
2019
1
更多...
语种
英语English
12
收录类别
SCIE
5
CPCI-S
2
ESCI
1
资助机构
关键词
Mechanism design
9
Facility location
7
Approximation
3
Approximation ratio
3
Facility location game
3
Social choice
2
更多...
出处
Lecture Notes in Computer S...
3
Theoretical Computer Science
2
Annals of Operations Resear...
1
Applied Mathematics and Com...
1
Autonomous Agents and Multi...
1
Journal of Combinatorial Op...
1
更多...
资助项目
×
知识图谱
反馈留言
浏览/检索结果:共12条,第1-10条
已选(
0
)
清除
条数/页:
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
排序方式:
请选择
作者升序
作者降序
发表日期升序
发表日期降序
题名升序
题名降序
期刊影响因子升序
期刊影响因子降序
WOS被引频次升序
WOS被引频次降序
提交时间升序
提交时间降序
Two-facility-location games with mixed types of agents
期刊论文
Applied Mathematics and Computation,2024, 卷号: 466
作者:
Gai, Ling
;
Liang, Mengpei
;
Wang, Chenhao
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:14/0
  |  
提交时间:2024/05/07
Approximation ratio
Facility location
Mechanism design
Strategy-proofness
Facility location games with ordinal preferences
期刊论文
Theoretical Computer Science,2023, 卷号: 979
作者:
Chan, Hau
;
Gong, Zifan
;
Li, Minming
;
Wang, Chenhao
;
Zhao, Yingchao
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:20/0
  |  
提交时间:2023/11/21
Approximation
Facility location
Mechanism design
Strategyproofness
Discrete facility location games with different preferences
期刊论文
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization,2023, 卷号: 46, 期号: 2
作者:
Gai, Ling
;
Liang, Mengpei
;
Wang, Chenhao
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:14/0
  |  
提交时间:2023/09/21
Approximation ratio
Facility location game
Mechanism design
Strategyproofness
Mechanisms for dual-role-facility location games: Truthfulness and approximability
期刊论文
Theoretical Computer Science,2022, 卷号: 932, 页码: 69-83
作者:
Chen, Xujin
;
Li, Minming
;
Wang, Changjun
;
Wang, Chenhao
;
Zhang, Mengqi
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:13/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/11/14
Approximation
Facility location
Mechanism design
Truthfulness
A multi-period closed-loop supply chain network design with circular route planning
期刊论文
Annals of Operations Research,2022, 卷号: 348, 期号: 3, 页码: 1195-1233
作者:
Han, Shuihua
;
Mo, Yudi
;
Chen, Linlin
;
Luo, Zongwei
;
Foropon, Cyril R.H.
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:24/0
  |  
提交时间:2025/07/22
Carbon emissions
Circular transportation mechanism
Closed-loop supply chain network design
Routing optimization
Supply Chain Management (T)
Budget feasible mechanisms for facility location games with strategic facilities
期刊论文
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,2022, 卷号: 36, 期号: 2
作者:
Li, Minming
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:15/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/06/10
Approximation ratio
Budget feasibility
Facility location
Mechanism design
Strategyproof Facility Location with Limited Locations
期刊论文
Journal of the Operations Research Society of China,2022
作者:
Tang, Zhongzheng
;
Wang, Chenhao
;
Zhang, Mengqi
;
Zhao, Yingchao
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:30/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/02/23
Facility location
Mechanism design
Social choice
Mechanism Design for Facility Location with Fractional Preferences and Minimum Distance
会议论文
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Tainan, TAIWAN, P.R.China, OCT 24-26, 2021
作者:
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:21/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/06/06
Approximation
Facility location
Mechanism design
Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations
会议论文
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Dallas, December 11-13, 2020
作者:
Tang, Zhongzheng
;
Wang, Chenhao
;
Zhang, Mengqi
;
Zhao, Yingchao
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:12/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/06/06
Facility location
Mechanism design
Social choice
Truthful mechanisms for location games of dual-role facilities
会议论文
Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, Montreal, CANADA, MAY 13-17, 2019
作者:
Chen, Xujin
;
Li, Minming
;
Wang, Changjun
;
Wang, Chenhao
;
Zhao, Yingchao
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:10/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/06/06
Facility location game
Payments
Truthful mechanism design